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Abstract—The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is a
vital element in the current development of the smart grid. AMI
technologies provide electric utilities with an effective way of con-
tinuous monitoring and remote control of smart grid components.
However, owing to its increasing scale and cyber-physical nature,
the AMI has been faced with security threats in both cyber and
physical domains. This paper provides a comprehensive review of
the crucial cyber-physical attacks and counter defense mechanisms
in the AMI. First, two attack surfaces are surveyed in the AMI
including the communication network and smart meters. The
potential cyber-physical attacks are then reviewed for each attack
surface. Next, the attack models and their cyber and physical
impacts on the smart grid are studied for comparison. Counter
defense mechanisms that help mitigate these security threats are
discussed. Finally, several mathematical tools which may help in
analysis and implementation of security solutions are summarized.
Index Terms—AMI, Attack Surface, Cyber-Physical Security,
Defense Mechanism, Smart Grid
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is a complex cyber-physical system (CPS)
incorporating various spatially distributed subsystems including
sensors, actuators, and controllers, which is expected to be a
critical technological infrastructure for our nation [1]. The AMI
is one important element of the smart grid being implemented
allowing for bi-directional communication between electric util-
ity companies and customers [2]–[4]. As shown in Fig. 1, the
AMI mainly integrates the information/communication network,
smart meters, and meter data management system (MDMS).
The communication network of the AMI is primarily comprised
of three important areas including home area network (HAN),
wide area network (WAN), and the utility system. Smart meters
are the main customer-side installed electronic devices in the
AMI, which forward the customers’ electricity consumption
information to the electric utility. The utility then integrates
these information to generate electricity bills, enable demand
response, predict user electricity consumption patterns, and
update pricing in real time.
Due to its increasing scale and cyber-physical nature, the
security issues of the AMI have become a recent area of
interest [5]–[11]. According to the 2014 McAfee report [7],
80% of the surveyed electric utilities have faced at least one
large-scale Denial of Service (DoS) attack to their communica-
tion networks, and 85% of the utilities have suffered network
infiltrations. Potential cyber security threats and vulnerabilities
existing in the AMI are analyzed in [8]. For a specific DoS
attack targeted at the AMI communication network, the attack
model and its physical impact are proposed in [9], where an
attacker may compromise the AMI devices and disrupt data
Fig. 1: The AMI network model and its main components.
traffic on the network. A malicious attack targetting smart
meters is introduced in [10], where an attacker can alter the
meter measurement data. A cyber attack scenario of an attacker
hacking the AMI communication network and performing DoS
attacks is simulated in [11].
This paper intends to provide a systematic summary of the
critical cyber-physical attacks and counter defense mechanisms
in the AMI, and survey main mathematical tools for analyzing
these attack-defense scenarios. In particular, this paper has three
main objectives listed as follows:
1) Survey the two main attack surfaces in the AMI and the
potential cyber-physical attacks for each attack surface.
2) Study the attack models and their cyber and physical
impacts on the smart grid.
3) Summary countermeasure approaches and analytical
frameworks which can help in analyzing the AMI attack-
defense scenarios and devising proper defense strategies.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY THREATS IN AMI
As a critical point between electric utilities and customers,
the security of AMI is an important area for the smart grid mon-
itoring and operation and the customers’ privacy. For example,
a malicious attacker can manually compromise smart meters
and change the meter measurements, affecting the integrity of
reported data. Moreover, the information and communication
technologies (ICTs) integrated with the AMI opens window
for potential hackers, where cyber attacks can compromise
electronic devices, and insert bad data into the communication
network. Owing to the expansive deployment of the AMI
devices, these cyber-physical attacks can have the potential to
disconnect electricity from end consumers, even leading the
cascading failures in smart grid and other connected critical
infrastructures such as transportation and telecommunications.
In this section, we will review two main attack surfaces in the
AMI including the smart meter and the communication network,
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Fig. 2: Typical elements of smart meter.
and provide a summary of the potential cyber-physical attacks
targeted at each one.
A. Smart Meters
Smart meters are electronic devices which records consump-
tion and then reports this information back to the utility, often
in assigned intervals. Smart meter facilitates the dash boarding
of smart grid system monitoring, automated operation, system
recovery, dynamic electricity pricing, and more consumption-
based customer services, whose typical elements are shown in
Fig. 2. Traditional meters were already susceptible to physical
attacks due to their importance, but smart meters open another
window that cyber attackers can get access to. In design, smart
meters are purchased in bulk (by the millions) and thus driven
by low cost. As a result, internal hardware and firmware may
be limited. In the sense of capabilities, it means that security
often takes a backseat when design must meet both the cost
and requirements. Coupled with the vase number in deployment
and limited defense resource, a series of the theoretical and
demonstrated attacks aimed at compromising smart meters [12]–
[20] are shown as follows:
• Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks compromise smart meters
by overwhelming a network or tampering with the routing.
This attack can render a meter incapable of responding to
any request from electric utilities or consumers.
• False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) insert random and/or
deliberate errors within normal smart meter traffic activity
to cause corrupted measurements to deliverately cause
issues in the smart grid network.
• De-pseudonymization Attacks compromise identity and pri-
vacy of smart meter data.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attacks where attackers can place
themselves between electric utilities and customers.
• Meter Spoofing and Energy Fraud Attacks can get the ID
number of smart meter through physical access.
• Authentication Attacks can authenticate hackers as a valid
customer via methods such as stealing a session or acquir-
ing the authentication from memory.
• Disaggregation Attacks attempt to profile customer energy
consumption behavior.
B. AMI Communication Network
The communication network is a key component of the AMI
that links the devices using a wireless Frequency Hopping
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) mesh or a similar type cellular net-
work. The AMI communication network usually accomplishes
Fig. 3: The communication network of AMI and the potential
cyber-physical attacks targeted at the network.
the link to the local HAN on the consumers’ side through WiFi,
Zigbee or Z-wave protocols. The communication network then
connect to the utilitys WAN, which is usually an Ethernet infras-
tructure. Moreover, the communications network is distributed
through an urban sector in company with the smart grid. The
scale of this network can vary from a couple of hundreds to
thousands of smart meter data collector devices. Each collector
is capable of serving thousands of smart meters, raising the
number of devices to multiple thousands or millions in total.
Therefore, the vulnerabilities of the AMI communication net-
work can be exploited or disabled by attacks on the underlying
communication infrastructure, insertion of false user requests,
unauthorized alteration of demand side schedules and illegal
market manipulation; all of which can impact system operations
and result in both power shortage, loss of trust and negative
economic impacts. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the potential and
demonstrated attacks aimed at the communication network [6]–
[11], [21]–[23] are shown as follows:
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks which target
AMI communication networks’ data collector, preventing
the normal communication between Wide Area Network
(WAN) and Neighborhood Area Network (NAN).
• False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) introduce random
and corrupted data within standard traffic activity in order
to cause invalid measurements with the goal of disrupting
the AMI network.
• Physical Attacks that compromise the smart meter data
collectors, and disrupt the communication between the
electric utility and the end customer of power.
• WiFi/ZigBee Attacks in the AMI communication networks
that attack the WiFi/ZigBee networks in Home Area Net-
work (HAN).
• Internet Attacks that compromise the software and systems
in electric utilities.
• Data Confidentiality Attack attempts to compromise the
information between electric utilities and end customers
by targeting the hardware within the AMI communication
network.
A summary of the different types of cyber and physical
attacks targeted at the AMI systems including the smart meter
and the communication network is shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Cyber and Physical Attacks Targeted at the AMI
Attack Type Attack Target
Smart Meter AMI Communication Network
Physical 1. Meter Manipulation2. Meter Spoofing and Energy Fraud Attack 1. Physical Attack
Cyber
Availability 1. Denial of Service (DoS) 1. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Integrity 1. False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) 2. False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)
Confidentiality
1. De-pseudonymization Attack
2. Man-in-the-middle Attack
3. Authentication Attack
4. Disaggregation Attack
1. WiFi/ZigBee Attack
2. Internet Attack
3. Data Confidentiality Attack
III. DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN SMART METERS
Among the cyber-physical security threats faced by the smart
meters, electricity theft is a major security challenge caused
by meter manipulation and FDIA, where malicious attackers
can alter consumption measurements collected by smart meters.
According to a World Bank report [24], [25], electricity theft
reaches up to 50% in some jurisdictions of developing countries.
The significance of security for smart meters has been a well-
researched topic in the literature, where the focus is on ensuring
power availability at all times [13], [26]. Traditional research
for detecting electricity theft has focused on implementing
specific devices, like wireless sensors and balance meters, to
provide a high theft detection rate [22], [23]. An anti-tampering
sensor based AMI intrusion detection mechanism was intro-
duced in [22], where anti-tampering sensors were embedded
into smart meters. In [23], a limited number of balanced meters
were installed in the smart grid distribution network, so that
the system operator can detect whether abnormal smart meters
existing in the network. Since additional devices need to be
installed in these works, the cost of detecting the abnormal ac-
tions of millions of smart meters will be significantly increases.
Moreover, all of these works cannot detect specific smart meters
that being hacked.
A. Machine Learning for Electricity Theft Detection
Recently, machine learning have been used to train a classifier
based on detailed electricity usage measurements, which aims to
classify the normal usage versus electricity theft. The basic pro-
cedure of this approach consists of seven parts: data collection
and preprocessing, feature extraction, machine learning based
classifier training, data classification, and suspected electricity
theft generation.
In [16], Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based theft
detection was proposed to detect abnormalities in electricity
consumption behavior. A method is proposed which leverages
the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise
(DBSCAN) algorithm, and this procedure is shown to properly
detect abnormalities in consumption behavior when used with
PCA. There are three advantages with the use of this method.
First, the researchers could calculate the consumption trends
which repeat over time by extracting principal components
which retain the maximum amount of variance in the data.
Components that belong in the lower variance are filtered out
as noise in usage behavior. Second, to process the massive
amount of data, the two principal components are noted to
allow visualization in a two-dimensional space. Third, anomaly
detection takes place in a set of data that includes the usage
of all consumers. This means that an attacker would have
trouble reverse engineering and avoiding detection as it would
require two things. Complete knowledge of every smart meter
and all consumer information being within the communications
network.
In [17], usage data was proved to be non-stationary and Auto
Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting
methods were proposed to validate readings. First, the ARMA
model is ill-suited for anomaly detection in electricity consump-
tion since most customers use up their power in a non-stationary
manner. The ARIMA forecasting methods are introduced for
validating electricity consumption readings. Second, to evaluate
the effectiveness of forecasting with ARIMA; a scenario where
smart meters were tampered with to allow electricity theft was
evaluated. Third, introducing complementary checks on factors
such as mean and variance was found to aid in the mitigation
of electricity theft by 77.56%
In [18], CPBETF (Consumption Pattern-Based Energy Theft
Detector) which employs a multi-class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) for each customer was formulated. In this detection,
transformer meters measure the total consumption of each
neighborhood. Then, the total usage reported by the smart
meters is compared to the measurements from the transformers.
Users and clients will be marked as suspicious if a nontechnical
loss (NTL) is detected at this level. A Users past data as well
as synthetic attack datasets are used to train a multi-class SVM
(support vector machine). With this, a classifier can be generated
to determine whether the recent sample is either benign or
malicious.
Apart from the above techniques many other classification
methods exist for detection of energy theft. Methods such as,
fuzzy logic classification and neural networks are also feasible.
However, these works ignore the attack models of potential
thieves and the effectiveness of anomaly detector was only
evaluated based on given datasets of attack examples.
B. Game Theory for Electricity Theft Detection
Game theoretic theft detection schemes have been proposed
recently and provide another angle on solving the electricity
theft issues [12], [19]. To solve the problem of theft detection,
a single leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game can be formu-
lated between the utility and thieves to characterize strategic
interactions between the two [12]. In this game, the utility
TABLE II: Different Application Techniques for Electricity Theft Detection
Electricity Theft Detection Techniques Advantage Disadvantage
Traditional Method
[22-26]
Anti-tampering Sensor [22] 1. Reduce risks due to non-billed electricity 1. Not identify specific meters being compromised2. Increase the cost of deploying and operating
Trusted Balanced Meter [23]
Machine Learning
[16-18]
PCA based detection [16] 1. Implement of Meter Data Management System
2. Train a classifier based on usage data
3. Increase effectiveness of theft detection
1. Ignore the attack models of potential thieves
2. Evaluate effectiveness only on given attack example
3. Ignore the privacy of customer consumptionARIMA based Detection [17]
SVM based Detection [18]
Game Theory [12] Stackelberg Game [12]
1. Propose interactions between utility and thieves
2. Consider the worst case of electricity theft
3. Consider the privacy of customer consumption
1. Ignore coordination between the electricity thieves
intended to maximize the detection probability and minimize
the investment in monitoring fraud. On the other hand, each
electricity thief was to steal a certain amount of power and
minimize the probability being uncovered. Based on the Nash
equilibrium of the formulated game, the optimal strategies for
the defender are derived for selecting the sample rate and the
optimal tariff.
However, these works assume all electricity thieves as a
player, and the competition between thieves was ignored in the
model. If thieves add high loads to the distribution networks and
steal electricity at the same time, the resulting power surges and
electrical system failures can cause power outages, raising the
possibility of thefts being detected. A summary of the different
applications for electricity theft in the AMI is shown in Table II.
IV. DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN AMI COMMUNICATION
NETWORK
In this section, we first study the model of the AMI commu-
nication network. Then, we survey two specific game-theoretic
models for defending the communication network against data
confidentiality attacks and distributed DoS attacks, respectively.
Consider the AMI communication network as a tree-pattern
architecture T with one root node, where nodes represent the
AMI devices. Let N = {1, 2, ..., N} denote the set of nodes in
T , where N is the total number of nodes, and the root node
is referred as 1. Each node i ∈ N \ {1} records data from its
children nodes Ch(i), combines this data as a whole, and finally
sends it to its respective parent node f(i). Assume that a total
of N aggregation levels existing in T , and let Ni denote the set
of nodes belonging to the i-th aggregation level. In the attack-
defense scenario, the attacker can select each node for attacking.
Therefore, game theory provides a way for the defender to find
the optimal defense mechanism.
A. Defense Mechanisms for Data Confidentiality Attacks
In [27], the data confidentiality attacks in the AMI commu-
nication network are analyzed. In this attack-defense scenario,
the attacker aims to compromise the AMI data by attacking the
nodes of the communication network T without being detected.
Correspondingly, out of a set, the defender may pick one secu-
rity mode available for each node. A two-player noncooperative
game is formulated to model the interaction between the two.
In this game, the attacker’s strategy is defined as the probability
pi of attacking node i, which is subject to a budget limitation,∑
i pi ≤ P ≤ 1,∀i. In contrast, the defender’s strategy is
defined as the encryption rate si of the packets at node i,
TABLE III: Game Theoretic Applications
Game Theoretic Applicaitons Game Features
Defending AMI communication network
against data confidentiality attacks [28]
1. Noncooperative
2. Static
3. Two-player
4. Nash equilibrium
Protecting AMI communication network
against data confidentiality attacks [29]
1. Noncooperative
2. Stackerlberg
3. Two-player
4. Stackerlberg equilibrium
Protecting AMI communication network
against DDoS attacks [31]
1. Noncooperative
2. Bayesian
3. Multiple-player
4. Nash equilibrium
which is subject to a budget constraint
∑
i si ≤ S ≤ N, ∀i.
The attacker and defender’s utility functions are determined by
the data value or security asset Wi for each node i. Take a
case where the defender and attacker know everything about a
system. In this case the Nash equilibrium by definition is the
optimal arrangement which provides the most utility to each
player from the actions of other players [28], [29]. In the end,
The Nash equilibrium can derive the behavior to be expected
from both attacker and defender.
However, assume the attacker chooses their strategy based
on based on security techniques deployed in the target system.
Therefore, the interactions between the two can be formulated
by a Stackelberg game [30]. In this game, the defender acts
as a leader which attempts to compose encryption rates. The
defenders purpose is to adjust encryption rates to protect the
security of the most amount of data possible. The method
which the Stackelberg games solve the problem is backwards
induction, producing a solution known as Stackelberg Equilib-
rium (SE) [29]. In this game, the defender may anticipate the
attackers actions, find an efficient defense budget, and create
the optimal encryption rate on each device in the AMI with the
help of the SE in order to mitigate attacks.
B. Defense Mechanisms for Distributed DoS Attacks
In [31], the honeypot based defense mechanism is imple-
mented for countering distributed DoS attacks in the AMI com-
munication network, where honeypots are defined as defense
resources that help lure, discover, and gather attack information.
A Bayesian honeypot game model is formulated between benign
users and malicious ones. The equilibrium in conditions can be
achieved for deriving the strategies in use of honeypots and
anti-honeypots.
The Bayesian game is defined as follows: G1 as G1 ,
{{Z,W}, {FZ ,FW}, {JZ ,JW}}, where Z , {Z1, Z2, Z3}
usually represent an array of services such as: honeypots, real
communications, and anti-honeypots. As provided by the smart
grid; W , {W1,W2} is the set of unique visitors: in this
case non-malicious users and malicious attackers. {FZ ,FW}
denotes the set of strategies used by the attackers and honeypots
respectively. FZ , {Ω1,Ω2} denotes a binary variable. Ω1
represents a service which is being provided. FW , {Λ1,Λ2}
also represent a set of binary variables. To represent providing
access: Λ1 is used. {JZ ,JW} denotes player payoff, where
JZ represents the real server payoffs and JW represents the
payoff for the visitors. The payoffs of legitimate users and
attackers are analyzed via game trees. To evaluate the overall
performance of the proposed scheme, an AMI network testbed
is constructed. A summary of the different game-theoretic
applications for protecting the AMI communication network is
shown in Table III.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview on
the potential cyber and physical attacks targeted at the AMI,
especially in smart meters and the communication network.
We have identified the main security threat for smart meters:
electricity theft, and categorized three detection mechanisms
including device implementation, machine learning and game
theory. Machine learning provides a more efficient way for
theft detection than device implementation. And game theory
formulates the interaction model between utility and thieves
for optimal detection strategies. Game theory is expected to
become a key analysis tool for analyzing cyber-physical security
issues. Therefore, for AMI communication network, we survey
two specific game-theoretic models for protecting the network
against data confidentiality attacks and distributed DoS attacks,
respectively. As we have reviewed, game theory provides a way
to predict the rational attack actions and derive the optimal
defense strategies against potential attacks.
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